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previous praise for jonathan r. dull’s 
The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War
“A magnifi cent book, another tour de force in combined diplomat-
ic, political, and naval history.”—n. a. m. rodger , author of The 
Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain
“Dull has written a magisterial history of the war and the role of 
the French Navy. . . . This history will long stand as the defi nitive 
work on the French Navy of the period.”—harold n. boyer , 
Sea History
“This book is not merely a history of the French Navy but a step-by-
step exposition of a hugely complex war, laid out by a single histori-
an whose starting point is the diplomacy and politics of the protag-
onists, and who fi ts the French Navy into this framework. . . . Dull 
skillfully places the last piece in the jigsaw and constructs a sophis-
ticated view of the war from the perspective of Versailles, while at 
the same time presenting a patient and detailed analysis of the Brit-
ish war effort.”—roger knight , Mariner’s Mirror
“Those interested in learning the inside story of how govern-
ments actually conduct war will fi nd this a fascinating work, and 
a sobering refl ection of how they probably still carry on today.”
 —robert guttman , Military History
“This excellent book deserves a wide audience. It far surpasses 
most histories of the Seven Years’ War. . . . This book belongs 
on the shelf of anyone seriously interested in early American 
and Atlantic history, French maritime and naval history, and in 
the history of international relations in the eighteenth century.”
 —james pritchard , Journal of Military History
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“Dull’s book is a monument to careful scholarship. With clear, con-
cise prose, he navigates deftly through a complex tale of war, diplo-
macy, and politics. His book is the defi nitive work on this topic.”
 —Canadian Journal of History
“With the publication of Jonathan R. Dull’s The French Navy and 
the Seven Years’ War, we at last have an accessible, brisk, and eru-
dite narrative of this global struggle.”—rafe blaufarb , Jour-
nal of Modern History
“An impressive and an important addition to the literature. The 
French Navy and the Seven Years’ War will for years to come be 
an essential addition to the library of specialists and students 
of eighteenth century naval (and diplomatic) history alike.”
 —olaf uwe janzen , Northern Mariner
“There are a great many books for English-speaking readers con-
cerning the British Royal Navy in the 18th century, but not many 
that provide solid, well-researched material concerning its great-
est rival, the French Navy. Dull helps fi ll in that gap and provides 
some much-needed balance with this work. Overall, this is a much-
needed study for any scholar interested in this time period or in 
western naval and maritime history.”—Choice
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Between 1689 and 1815 the British (or initially the English allied 
with the Scots) fought seven wars against France. Their navies 
played an important, sometimes critical, role. The power of the ri-
val navies was based chiefl y on their ships of the line, great wood-
en warships carrying two or three tiers of iron or brass cannon. The 
age of the ship of the line is largely the story of the navies of Brit-
ain and France, the two powers best able to afford the massively 
expensive fl eets of ships of the line. Although Spain and the Neth-
erlands maintained good sized navies throughout the period, by 
the early eighteenth century they had become subordinate play-
ers in the naval rivalry of Britain and France. Other navies, such 
as those of Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Naples, and Venice, were 
regional powers, largely restricted to the Baltic or Mediterranean 
Seas. The goal of this book is to explain the background, course, 
and results of the seven wars between the British and French, par-
ticularly the causes of the fi nal British triumph.
By treating the British and French navies in tandem I hope to 
give a balanced account of their rivalry; I confess to loving both 
countries and warmly supporting their friendship. The statesmen 
of the eighteenth century generally saw war not primarily as a con-
test of societies but more as a contest of economies, in which victory 
Preface
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went to the strongest, not to the “best,” and in which the chief vir-
tue was endurance. I approach these wars in much the same way, 
using ships of the line as the measure of strength. Thus this book 
pays as much attention to the number of ships of the line engaged 
in the various campaigns as to the admirals and statesmen who di-
rected them. In all the Franco-British wars of the period, including 
the one Britain lost, the War of American Independence, the side 
that could put the most ships of the line to sea was successful.
I have learned much by conversations with historians more 
knowledgeable than I am in nautical matters. I am particularly 
grateful to Daniel Baugh, Richard Harding, John Hattendorf, Rog-
er Knight, Nicholas Rodger, Patrick Villiers, and Clive Wilkinson; 
the mistakes I have made are totally my responsibility. Some of 
these conversations took place during either a 2005 trip to Paris 
or a 2006 trip to Greenwich, England, made possible, respective-
ly, by the Association France-Amériques and the National Mari-
time Museum. I am extremely grateful to the members of both 
organizations for their generosity, hospitality, and kindness, par-
ticularly to Patricia Cédelle and Janet Norton, who handled the re-
spective arrangements.
In the interest of saving space I will not repeat the acknowledgments 
to friends and colleagues that I made in my last book, The French 
Navy and the Seven Years’ War. I am still indebted to all of them for 
their help or encouragement. I must, however, again thank my 
sister, Caroline Hamburger, for her hospitality during the times I 
was in London, and my wife, Susan Kruger, for her constant help-
fulness and support. I dedicate this book to my children, Veronica 
Lamka, Robert Dull, Max Kruger-Dull, and Anna Kruger-Dull, in 
the hope that someday they will live in a world without war.
viii preface
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map 1. Europe in 1750
From Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War (Nebraska, 2005).
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map 2. The Caribbean
From Dull, The French Navy and the Seven Years’ War (Nebraska, 2005).
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IBetween the 1650s and the 1850s, naval warfare was ruled by the 
ship of the line and the line of battle after which it was named. 
These huge three-masted wooden ships were some 120 to 210 feet 
long with a beam (width) of 30 to 60 feet. They carried between 
40 and 130 cannon mounted along two, three, or, in the case of 
the Spanish ship of the line Santísima Trinidad, four decks.1 The 
ship of the line was the most expensive, technologically advanced, 
and visually impressive weapon of its day. It also was the measure 
of national naval power, like the dreadnought of World War I or 
the aircraft carrier of World War II. The line of battle—a string of 
warships following each other bow to stern—was the best way to 
bring its power to bear, as each ship thus could give support to 
neighboring ships. Only in shallow or poorly charted waters, like 
the eastern Baltic, was the ship of the line not dominant; there the 
galley, a shallow-draft oar-powered warship, continued to play a 
major role throughout the eighteenth century.
The era of the ship of the line began when its two components, 
the ship of the line and the line of battle, were combined. That 
time was long in coming. The line of battle is so logical an arrange-
ment that the earliest groups of European ships carrying cannon 
1. The Ship of the Line Begins Its Reign
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sometimes made use of it. A Portuguese fl eet commanded by Vasco 
da Gama seems to have employed a line of battle off the coast of 
India in 1502.2 Its use was intermittent, however, because its main 
advantage was mutual support in an artillery duel. Some naval 
battles consisted of such duels; the English, for example, foiled the 
Spanish Armada of 1588 by the use of cannon. Until the middle 
of the seventeenth century, however, naval warfare often involved 
either boarding (ships grappling an opponent and then dispatching 
a boarding party) or the use of fi re ships (setting ships on fi re in 
order to ram them into enemy vessels). The Dutch, who by the 1640s 
had become the greatest naval power in Europe, were masters of 
a variety of tactics. In 1639, they used both a line of battle and fi re 
ships against a huge Spanish fl eet off the English coast.3
The use of great ships of 50 or more cannon also was long estab-
lished by 1650. Most major naval powers had one or more of these 
ships, such as the English Prince Royal of 55 cannon, launched in 
1610, and the Sovereign of the Seas, 90 cannon, launched in 1637, or 
the French Couronne, 68, launched in 1638. These ships, however, 
were clumsy to sail and expensive to build, man, and maintain. As 
an admiral’s fl agship they could be useful in a battle, but without 
other ships of similar size they could not alter the disorganized 
melee of a naval battle based on boarding or the use of fi re ships. 
Fleets during the fi rst half of the seventeenth century were very 
heterogeneous, moreover, frequently consisting mostly of converted 
merchant ships.
A turning point came in 1649 when the Parliament of England 
decided to build a group of very large and heavily armed frigates 
(fast, medium-sized warships usually carrying 20 or more cannon) 
that was the predecessor of groups (or “classes”) of ships of the line 
of a standard size. The thirteen ships of the Speaker class, launched 
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between 1650 and 1654, were of roughly similar size (about 750 
tons) and carried 48 to 56 cannon; in tonnage and armament they 
were similar to a very large galleon, the chief warship of the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and still the mainstay 
of the Spanish navy, but they were longer, lower, and faster than 
galleons. No other navy had a group of ships to match them; the 
Dutch navy, hitherto Europe’s best, continued to rely chiefl y on 
taking merchant ships into naval service.4
The line of battle fi rst was used, however, before most of the 
Speaker class were launched. Both England and the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands were republics, Charles I of England having 
been executed in 1649. Both were Protestant, too, although dif-
ferent enough in persuasion to create tension. It could be argued 
that they were natural allies against Catholic monarchies such as 
Spain and France; at any rate, geography did not automatically make 
them enemies. They were bitter trade rivals, however. Outside of 
Europe, trade rivalry, particularly for spices in Asia or slaves in 
Africa, frequently involved the use of force. As there were no effec-
tive international means of mediating disputes, the Netherlands 
and England were unable to resolve their trading disputes, and 
each feared domination by the other. As the crisis worsened, each 
tried to intimidate the other, leading in 1652 to a war that could 
have been avoided.5
Although the new English battle fl eet temporarily disrupted 
Dutch shipping and fought several battles, the fi rst campaign of 
the war was indecisive. On 29 March 1653 the three offi cers jointly 
commanding the English navy issued instructions that guaranteed 
its fl eets henceforth would fi ght in a battle line. Two months later the 
English won a smashing victory off the Gabbard shoal in the North 
Sea, largely due to their use of the line of battle.6 This marriage of 
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ship and tactics endured for two centuries. The sailing ship line 
of battle dominated naval warfare through the Battle of Sinope in 
1853, in which a line of Russian ships of the line destroyed a group 
of Turkish frigates. During the ensuing Crimean War of 1854–56, 
ships of the line, including some equipped with auxiliary steam 
power, were the chief naval weapon, although by now they were 
vulnerable to explosive shells. The death blow to the ship of the 
line, however, was the launching of the fi rst iron warships in the 
early 1860s.7 The line of battle persisted through the age of iron 
and steel battleships, though, until the last great fl eet action, the 
1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf.
II
What accounts for so enduring a marriage between this weapon and 
these tactics? In part, both were the product of the same technologi-
cal advances, the creation of large cannon fi ring extremely heavy 
cannonballs and the development of gun ports, openings cut in the 
sides of ships through which cannon could fi re. It took a very large 
ship to carry banks of cannon weighing several tons apiece. Equally 
important the ship needed great strength to withstand the impact 
of cannon balls sometimes weighing as much as 42 pounds; in the 
late eighteenth century, the British even developed cannon fi ring a 
68-pound ball. Ships needed as many cannon as they could carry, 
using equal numbers on both sides, starboard and port. Moreover, 
ships needed large crews to work their sails and fi re their cannon; a 
French cannon fi ring a 36-pound ball, for example, weighed more 
than four tons and needed fourteen men to fi re it.8 Although crew 
members slept and ate among the guns, ships needed space for water, 
food and drink, munitions, and various spare parts and supplies.
The ship of the line was like a fl oating fortress, but it had points 
of weakness that a fortress did not. Its bow and stern could not be 
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as strong and straight as its sides if it were to maneuver through the 
water, and it had room for only a few cannon facing directly ahead 
or astern. This made it vulnerable to a volley of cannon balls fi red 
from directly in front or behind it. Not only could these penetrate 
more easily, but also once inside an enemy ship they would fi nd 
little resistance, since the ship of the line was not divided into com-
partments like a modern steel ship. Such an attack, called “raking,” 
usually infl icted heavy casualties and damage. A lone ship had only 
its speed and maneuverability to protect it from raking; on its own a 
ship of the line was vulnerable even to frigates, which were smaller 
but more nimble except in a heavy wind. The best protection for 
a ship of the line was having other ships of the line just ahead of 
and just behind it. This mutual support against raking depended 
on the ships sailing together in as close and straight a line as pos-
sible. This line of battle also had offensive advantages. If fl eets were 
passing in opposite directions, each ship could pound the hulls or 
fi re into the masts of several opponents in succession.
The line of battle also was effective, particularly as a defensive 
tactic, because of other limitations of wooden sailing warships. 
There were two major ways of overcoming a line of battle. The fi rst 
was “doubling” one of the ends of the line, that is, placing warships 
on both sides of the enemy ships at either the front or back end 
of the line. The second was to break the line by a concentration 
of force somewhere in its middle. Both tactics were very diffi cult 
unless the attacker had a considerable advantage in numbers or 
skill, because it was much easier for sailing ships to keep formation 
and maintain mutual support while on the defensive. Diffi culties 
in communicating between ships and in maneuvering in unison 
made coordinating an attack so challenging that decisions in battle 
usually had to be left to individual ship captains.
Buy the Book
6 the ship of the line begins its reign
Throughout most of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
it was rare for a fl eet of superior size to suffer a decisive defeat. Sir 
Cloudesley Shovell, one of the leading admirals at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, claimed that without a miracle, numbers 
would gain the victory.9 Although generally British warships were 
sturdier and their crews better trained that were the French, the 
differences in quality between them usually were not enough to 
produce a major victory unless there was a substantial difference 
in numbers. Most battles ended with few ships being lost, and 
generally casualties were fewer than those in land battles involving 
similar numbers of men. Captured French ships served along-
side British ones and vice versa. Decisive battles, such as the 1759 
Battle of Quiberon, usually came after the quality of French crews 
had drastically declined. After the onset of the French Revolution, 
however, the French navy underwent a rapid decline, largely due to 
shortages of funds, sailors, and supplies. Admiral Horatio Nelson’s 
defeat of a larger Franco-Spanish fl eet at Trafalgar was due less to 
his genius than to the poor quality of the fl eet opposing him. Such 
a battle was unusual. In most cases the key factor in a battle was 
numerical superiority.
In spite of Nelson’s victories there was relatively little evolution in 
naval tactics between 1660 and 1815. Similarly the evolution of the 
ship of the line was gradual and unspectacular until the nineteenth 
century. The maximum size of a ship of the line increased slowly 
over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the 120-gun Nelson 
of 1805 was only 70 percent larger than the Sovereign of the Seas of 
1637.10 Vital components such as sternposts and mainmasts were 
best constructed from a single tree, whose maximum size was 
limited by nature. The British navy tried to compensate by packing 
more guns on the decks of its vessels, but this did not work very well; 
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an 80-gun French ship was almost as large and as powerful as a 
100-gun British ship. The fi rst “revolution” in the design of the ship 
of the line did not occur until near the end of its existence with the 
invention of the screw propeller and the use of steam. Admittedly 
the ship of the line did benefi t from continual improvements such 
as the development in the late eighteenth century of copper plating 
for hulls, which retarded the growth of marine organisms.
Such improvements, even if gradual, had some effect on naval 
warfare. A major difference between seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century navies was their endurance. The former was generally held 
in port during winter weather while the latter could fi ght year-round; 
the newer ships were less top-heavy and more maneuverable thanks 
to larger and better designed hulls and improvements in rigging 
and sails.11 A second difference was a large increase in the number 
of seamen per ship; for example, in 1690 a French 80-gun ship 
carried a crew of 600, a 74-gun ship a crew of 500, and a 64-gun 
ship a crew of 400. By 1759 an 80-gun ship required 860 men, a 
74-gun ship required 695, and a 64-gun ship required 500. Slightly 
more than half of the crews were petty offi cers and trained sailors. 
The remainder were ship’s boys, marines, and various landsmen. 
The same development occurred in the British navy.12
The requirements for a ship to serve in the line of battle also 
increased. In the middle of the seventeenth century, a ship with 40 
cannon qualifi ed as a ship of the line, but by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century at least 48 or 50 were needed. At the Battle of 
Beachy Head in 1690, for example, half of the French line of battle of 
seventy ships were ships mounting 50 to 58 cannon, although only 
one had fewer than 50. By the middle of the eighteenth century, 64 
cannon generally were needed, and in the 1780s, the French navy 
began phasing out ships carrying fewer than 74. The cumulative 
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effect was navies of bigger ships and more crewmen, which cost 
much more money. Louis XIV’s navy of 1692 had ninety-fi ve ships 
of the line plus half a dozen warships of 44 or 46 cannon, but only 
forty-nine ships carried 64 or more cannon; in 1782 the French 
navy had seventy-two ships of the line, of which sixty-seven carried 
64 or more.13
III
Although the English had a head start over the Dutch in the devel-
opment of both the ship of the line and the line of battle, the fi rst 
war between the two states (1652–54) was not decisive. During 
the war, power in the Commonwealth passed from Parliament to 
Oliver Cromwell. Faced with other threats, he did not choose to 
exploit the naval supremacy gained by the English navy. He signed 
a compromise peace with the States General, the ruling body of the 
Netherlands. After Cromwell’s death in late 1658, public support 
for the republic collapsed, in large part because of an expensive 
war against Spain begun in 1655. In 1660 the Stuart monarchy was 
restored. Naval construction slowed temporarily, largely because 
Parliament did not trust the new king, Charles II, but it did not 
completely stop.14 Charles II was a strong supporter of the navy, 
and his brother James served as lord high admiral between 1660 
and 1673. The navy continued to have a strong infl uence on Brit-
ish politics and diplomacy. For James and Charles, the Dutch were 
still the enemy, and the efforts to crush them had the potential side 
benefi t of strengthening the monarchy against Parliament. As we 
shall discuss in the next chapter, England fought two more wars 
against the Netherlands (1665–67 and 1672–74), but they were less 
successful than the fi rst had been. The Dutch learned from their 
shortcomings in the fi rst war. They built larger ships and eventu-
ally adopted the line of battle.15 They also benefi ted from excellent 
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political leadership and superb admirals. During the last of these 
wars, however, the Dutch were fi ghting for survival against another 
rival, one that had a far larger population than England as well as 
a huge army and a large navy. The English, too, soon realized that 
the Dutch were no longer their chief rival. A new competitor for 
both their navies had arisen: the navy of France.
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